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Abstract
We consider any network environment in which the “best shot
game” is played. This is the case where the possible actions are only
two for every node (0 and 1), and the best response for a node is 1 if
and only if all her neighbors play 0. A natural application of the model
is one in which the action 1 is the purchase of a good, which is locally
a public good, in the sense that it will be available also to neighbors.
This game typically exhibits a great multiplicity of equilibria. Imagine
a social planner whose scope is to find an optimal equilibrium, i.e. one
in which the number of nodes playing 1 is minimal. To find such an
equilibrium is a very hard task for any non–trivial network architec-
ture. We propose an implementable mechanism that, in the limit of
infinite time, reaches an optimal equilibrium, even if this equilibrium
and even the network structure is unknown to the social planner.
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1 Introduction.
Take an exogenous network in which otherwise homogeneous players (nodes)
play a public good game, which is the one defined Best shot game in Galeotti
et al. (2010).1 The best shot game is a discrete case, with restricted strategy
profiles and satiated utilities, of the model in Bramoulle´ and Kranton (2007)
and of the second stage of the game in Galeotti and Goyal (2008). The action
of each node i is an effort xi and her payoff depends on the aggregate effort
of herself and that of her neighbors, minus some cost for her own effort.
Here we restrict strategy profiles to the two specialized actions: xi ∈
{0, 1}.2 In this way ~x, a vector of specialized actions whose length is given
by the number of nodes, will characterize any possible configuration of the
system. We will consider the class of incentives such that, in Nash equilibrium
(NE), agent i will play action xi according to the following rule:
{
xi = 1 if xj = 0 for all neighbors j of node i;
xi = 0 otherwise.
(1)
We will study all the NE of the game: that is all those action profiles in which,
for any link, not both nodes of the link put in effort 1; but at the same time
for any node, if we consider the set including itself and its neighborhood,
at least one node in this set puts in effort 1. Mathematically, the subset
of nodes playing 1 in a NE will then be a maximal independent set of the
network, as it is called in graph theory.
The next example will give some insight on the maximal independent
sets, our NE, for simple networks.
Example 1 A network of 9 nodes.
Figure 1 shows four possible NE for the same network of 9 nodes. Black
nodes are those playing 1, while all the others are playing 0. The bottom–
right NE is the only one in which only three nodes play action 1. If we assume
action 1 to be a costly action, interpreting it as the purchase of a local public
good, then the bottom–right NE is socially optimal, at least regarding costs.

1Galeotti et al. (2010) give this name in Example 2 and use it throughout the paper.
The name Best shot game comes from Hirschleifer (1983), where it is however described
as a non–network game.
2One result in Bramoulle´ and Kranton (2007) is actually that, even when the possible
actions of nodes are continuous, in a stable equilibrium every agent would play either 0 or
a fixed value e∗ > 0 which can be normalized to 1.
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Figure 1: Four NE for a 9–nodes network.
By considering this last example, a first intuition is that when more con-
nected nodes play 1, then the number of 1–players in equilibrium is reduced.
The extremal case of this will happen on a star–shaped network, as shown
in the next example.
Example 2 The star.
It is easy to see that the star has only two maximal independent sets (see
Figure 2): one in which the center alone plays 1, and another one in which
the spokes do so. If we are looking for efficiency (defined as fewer 1s, which
are supposed to be costly) it is very easy to find that the first case is the best
one. Suppose that we are in the bad NE (spokes exerting the costly effort),
then a social planner could shift to the good equilibrium by incentivating a
contribution from the center. When the center is contributing, then, by best
response, all spokes stop doing so. This mechanism will be formalized in the
next section, but the idea is that of incentivating a contribution from agents
that were not contributing in a NE, thus the system will move to a new NE,
which may reduce the social cost of being in equilibrium. 
The problem of finding all maximal independent sets of a general network
is however not an easy one and will be discussed in Section 3. This problem is
3
Figure 2: The two NE of a star network.
actually NP–hard,3 as is the problem of finding those maximal independent
sets with more or less nodes playing 1. In a companion paper, Dall’Asta,
Pin and Ramezanpour (2009), we discuss these aspects in more detail for a
particular class of random networks. The next example may give a hint of
this.
Example 3 A regular random network.
Consider the regular random network illustrated (twice) in Figure 3. It
has 20 nodes, and each of them has exactly 4 links. In this case we cannot
propose any strategy that targets as contributors those nodes with many
links, as could be suggested from previous examples. This network in partic-
ular has 128 equilibria: 2 (one is in Figure 3, left) with 4 nodes contributing,
25 with 5, 58 with 6, 42 with 7, and only 1 (Figure 3, right) with 8 nodes
contributing. In Dall’Asta, Pin and Ramezanpour (2009) we consider such
networks consisting of a large number of nodes, and we use an analytic ap-
proach to compute the approximate number of NE as a function of the frac-
tion of contributors.4 The predictions are very accurate when the number
of nodes is large, but search algorithms are unable to successfully explore
3An optimization problem is NP-hard if it is as difficult as any problem in the NP–
complete (non–deterministic polynomial) class. Consider a general problem whose object
(input) is characterized by a certain size N (as could be the number of nodes in our case).
Here is given a non–rigorous definition: The problem is called NP–complete if there is no
algorithm that can find a solution to the problem, for any possible input of size N , in a
time that grows at most polynomially in N . An NP–complete problem is one in which the
time required to find a solution typically grows exponentially in N . In practice this means
that, even if a good computer can solve the problem in a reasonable time for N = 1.000,
the case N = 10.000 may take years to be solved.
4By adopting a mean field analysis, Lo´pez–Pintado (2008) identifies the mean fraction
of contributors for a typical NE.
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in finite time the large deviations predicted by the theory (this problem is
also NP–hard). For small networks, even if regular random, there is a lot
of variability. Other networks of 20 nodes and degree 4, generated with the
same random process, have completely different distributions. The only way
to find all the equilibria in a particular network is to control all the 220 ≃ 106
possible pure strategy profiles. 
Pajek Pajek
Figure 3: Two NE for the same regular random network of 20 nodes
and degree 4. Picture is obtained by means of the software Pajek
(http://pajek.imfm.si/).
From the point of view of economics, the rule specified in (1) is not behav-
ioral and could be justified by several modelling choices with rational agents.
Up to now we have defined (pure) Nash equilibria without explicitly defining
actions and payoffs; this however could easily be done. One possibility is
the following. Any agent attributes utility v to a homogeneous good, if she
has access to it (independently of whether it is provided by herself or by
any of her neighbors), and her utility is satiated by one unit of it. Finally,
the cost of providing the good is a positive value c < v. Since utilities are
satiated, and in equilibrium every agent has local access to the good, then
considering efficiency from the point of view of minimal aggregated costs is
enough to achieve global efficiency. In our model agents consider only local
spillovers and exclude any externality from any other non-neighbor player.
In this sense the network structure formalizes the range of the externalities.
Note however that, because of satiation, the utility of agents is not linear
in the contribution effort of neighbors, so that our model is not included in
the class of games analyzed by Ballester et al. (2006), hence it cannot be
solved with the help of Bonacich centrality. Bramoulle´ and Kranton (2007)
consider non–satiated utility functions and find the typical public–good dis-
crepancy between efficient strategy profiles and equilibria. A general class of
games that includes the one from Bramoulle´ and Kranton (2007) is analyzed
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in Bramoulle´ et al. (2009), however also their class does not include our
non–satiated utilities.
In next section we will define formally the general best reply mechanism
that we consider, and that we implement also in the numerical simulations.
From a theoretical point of view, it may seem that we exclude full rationality
when we assume that agents respond to changes with a best response rule
that considers only the present configuration but is myopic and not strategic
on possible future new changes. Consider, however, that another explanation
for agents not being interested in future expected payoffs is a high rate δ of
temporal discount.
The kind of situation we have in mind is that of every agent deciding
whether or not to exert a fixed costly effort that is beneficial to herself and
also to her neighbors, so that a typical situation of free riding incentives
arises. This could be the case with farmers or firms adopting new technolo-
gies, with an information network and a cost for possible failures.5 Another
application could be that of several municipalities in a given region; the
public good could be a library or a fire brigade, and two municipalities are
linked if the public good in one of them makes the same public good un-
desirable in the other one because of geographical proximity. Finally, since
the mechanism we propose requires low costs of shifting between strategies
and repeated interaction, a good application could be that of a big firm en-
couraging people to share cars in order to minimize parking places. Action
1 would mean ‘take the car’ and an employee would play 0 if a friend gives
her a lift. Generally, in any of these applications there could be a planner
whose objective could reasonably be that of minimizing costs.
Suppose that the planner considers all possible NE of the game (all max-
imal independent sets of the network) and wants to minimize among them
the number of nodes exerting effort 1 (i.e. find a maximal independent set
of minimal cardinality: MNE). She could impose the proper action on the
agents, and the resulting configuration, being a NE, would be stable with-
out imposing more incentives. Suppose, however, that the planner does not
know such an optimal distribution (remember that the theoretical problem
is typically a complex one) or that moreover she may not even know any-
thing about the network. Assuming that we also have a time dimension, our
question is: would it still be possible for the planner to build a mechanism
that would incentivate the agents to move towards an optimal MNE?6 Our
5This is the application proposed in Bramoulle´ and Kranton (2007), where they cite
the applied model in Foster and Rosenzweig (1995).
6We will use the term mechanism to differentiate it from algorithm. While the latter
is intended as a computational technique, the former is a plausible implementation of
any single step of such a technique into a real system, also allowing the interaction of
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answer is only theoretical but positive: at the limit of infinite time such a
mechanism exists, and it will lead to a MNE with probability 1.
What we assume is that the social planner’s goal is to minimize the costs
of a NE, when she has the possibility of incentivating players’ actions out of
equilibrium, but she is not able to modify the structure of the network. It is
clear that if the planner had the possibility of changing the network structure,
directly or by incentives, at a reasonable cost (as is the case considered on
a different network game by Haag ad Lagunoff (2006)) then the problem
would look very different. It would be enough to approximate a star–like
configuration such as the one analyzed in Example 2, and the solution would
easily be found.
In the next section we show how we obtain our result. We show that our
setup is included in the hypothesis of a theorem first proved in Geman and
Geman (1984) and presented here in Appendix A. The proof of this equiv-
alence is based on three lemmas, whose proofs are in Appendix B. Section
3 analyzes, mainly by means of numerical simulations, how the simulated
annealing approach that we propose performs in two very different network
structures: regular random networks and scale free networks. We conclude
the paper with Section 4.
2 Main result
The mechanism we study is defined in discrete time (t = 1, 2, 3, . . .). At
every time step the configuration ~xt of nodes’ actions satisfy condition (1)
for every node, and hence is a NE. Suppose then that at time 1 the system is
in a NE, so that xi,1 ∈ {0, 1} is a best response for every agent i, as specified
in (1). The planner does not know anything about the network, the only
thing she observes at any step t in time is the action of each player and
hence the aggregate number Mt =
∑
i xi,t of agents playing 1. At every time
step, she picks an agent it playing 0, at random with uniform probabilities,
and induces her to flip her strategy to 1.7 Let us call this transition F .
The transition F is defined only from a NE ~x to a non–NE ~x′. It defines a
Markov chain across all {0, 1} vectors ~x. In consequence of this flip, all the
other nodes in the network will change their strategy according to the best
response rule defined here below.
Consider the subset of unsatisfied agents in a non–NE configuration, i.e.
self–interested agents.
7This can easily be done through incentives. The reason why the planner is looking for
a minimum could be that she is financing all the agents exerting effort; in this case she
could raise her contribution to the agent up to the desired threshold level.
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any agent for which condition (1) is violated, either because she plays 0
and also all her neighbors do, or because she plays 1 and at least one of
her neighbors do the same. If we apply transition F to a node it who was
originally playing 0, then the set of unsatisfied nodes includes always elements
different from it; as in a NE there is always at least one node j playing 1
around any node it playing 0. The basic step of the best response rule, is
iterated by picking with uniform probabilities one of the unsatisfied nodes,
different from it, and flipping her strategy. Let us call this transition step B.
This basic step B clearly defines a Markov chain across all {0, 1} vectors ~x,
whose absorbing states are NE. In Proposition 4 we show that if we start from
a NE, we apply F once, and then we iterate B, we reach with probability 1,
and with a limited number of steps, a new NE. We show also that, for the
scope of this result, we can discard without loss of generality the possibility
of synchronous updating. It is clear that, in the assumptions of the model,
F is induced by the planner, while the iteration of B is obtained from the
endogenous adaptation of the agents, as long as they are not all satisfied.
When the system is stable again, i.e. again in a new NE, the planner will
observe a new configuration ~xnewt and the new aggregate quantity of 1’s, call
it Mnewt . The planner will accept the new configuration with probability{
1 if Mnewt < Mt ;
t−ǫ(M
new
t
−Mt) otherwise,
(2)
where ǫ > 0 is a constant. The second probability in (2) identifies the level
of rejection of non–improving changes.
We start by proving that ~xnewt is always a NE for any t (see Lemma 1
below). If the planner accepts the new configuration, then ~xt+1 = ~x
new
t and
Mt+1 = M
new
t , otherwise she will impose reverse incentives so that we return
to the original configuration,8 i.e. ~xt+1 = ~xt and Mt+1 =Mt.
In the limit t → ∞, the second probability in (2) goes to 0 and the
mechanism will converge to any member of a precise subset of NE. Call
the subset of such possible NE local minima.9 Every MNE is also a local
minimum. The question is whether the local minimum in which the process
ends is also a MNE. The aim of this paper is to show under which conditions
the answer is positive.
The structure of the proof is the following. We show that we meet the
conditions required for the application of a known theorem.
8This can be done by reverting all incentives to the nodes who changed; they are, by
following Lemma 2, restricted to a local neighborhood.
9It is also possible that the mechanism, at the limit t → ∞, alternates between more
than one single NE, if all of them have the same number of 1’s. Without loss of generality,
such subsets of NE can simply be included among local minima.
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Lemma 1 If we start from a NE and invert the action of one node from 0
to 1, then the best response rule of all the other nodes in the network will
imply a new NE.
Lemma 2 If we start from a NE and invert the action of one node from 0
to 1, then the best response rule of all the other nodes in the network will be
limited to the neighborhood of order 2 of the original node (i.e. the change is
only local).
Lemma 3 It is possible to reach any NE from any other NE with a finite
number of the following procedures: flip the action of a single node from 0 to
1 (transition F ) and obtain, by iterated best response of the nodes (transition
step B), a new NE.
Proposition 4 The probability π(ǫ) that the mechanism ends in a MNE, in
the limit t → ∞, is strictly positive for any ǫ > 0; it is decreasing in ǫ; and
finally, there exists an ǫ¯ > 0 such that, for any ǫ < ǫ¯, we have that π(ǫ) = 1
independently on the initial conditions.
Proof: consider the set Ω of NE of a given finite network, which is a
subset of all the {0, 1} vectors ~x, and call NΩ ≡ |Ω| its finite cardinality.
Call |~x| the number of agents playing 1 in an equilibrium ~x ∈ Ω, and define
U∗ ≡ max{|~x| : ~x ∈ Ω}, U∗ ≡ min{|~x| : ~x ∈ Ω}, and ∆ ≡ U
∗ − U∗.
If we apply first F to any ~x ∈ Ω and then we iterate B, then by the proof of
Lemmas 1 and 2, in a finite number of iterations we reach a new NE ~x′ ∈ Ω,
with ~x′ 6= ~x This defines a stochastic process X between the states of Ω
which is ergodic because of Lemma 3.
Then, we are in the conditions of Theorem B in Geman and Geman (1984)
(see Appendix A), and ǫ¯ ≡ 1
NΩ∆
. 
The lemmas are proven in Appendix B, by applying the discrete mathe-
matics of network theory. Lemmas 1 and 2 also guarantee that the proposed
mechanism is well defined.
The main proposition is obtained by including our setup in the general
hypothesis of the theory of simulated annealing, first proposed and formalized
in Kirkpatrick, Gelatt and Vecchi (1983). Simulated annealing is a heuristic
algorithm based essentially on the increasing rejection probability in a Monte
Carlo step, as the probability t−ǫ(M
new
t
−Mt) in (2), for our case. Simulated
annealing works exactly as described above, finding a global minimum of a
certain function, avoiding local minima. Theory tells us that, if the number
of possible configurations is finite, and it is possible to reach any configu-
ration from any other with basic steps, then a generalization of the above
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proposition holds. The rigorous proof that applies to our model can be found
in Theorem B of Geman and Geman (1984), which we discuss in Appendix
A. The original proof takes various pages, its intuition is that we are analyz-
ing a Markov chain of finite possible configurations (all the NE of the game)
which is ergodic for any finite t.
In our case, we consider all the NE as the possible states of the system;
they are finite because the network is finite. Lemmas 1 and 2 define a stochas-
tic process between the states of the system, and this process is ergodic by
Lemma 3. We thus meet the conditions that apply in Appendix A.
3 Accuracy vs. speed of convergence
The mechanism that we propose reaches an optimal outcome with probability
1 but is extremely time consuming. In this section we discuss how in some
cases the choice of a faster mechanism (i.e. a higher ǫ) could be useful if
we are looking for almost optimal solutions in shorter time. However, the
trade–off between accuracy and speed of convergence is very hard to compute
in general. Simple adaptations of the mechanism may not be useful at all in
some case, as we show here below by means of computer simulations.
We run simulations on random regular networks, as the one in example 3,
and on scale–free networks, as the one illustrated in the following example.10
Example 4 A scale–free network.
Consider the random scale–free network illustrated (twice) in Figure 4.
It has been generated with the simple algorithm proposed in Albert and
Barabasi (1999): it has 20 nodes, and they have an average degree of exactly
4 links. This network in particular has 48 equilibria: 2 (one is in Figure
4, left) with 4 nodes contributing, 2 with 5, 6 with 6, 5 with 7, 6 with
8, 9 with 9, 13 with 10, 4 with 11, and only 1 (Figure 4, right) with 12
nodes contributing. Other such networks of 20 nodes and average degree 4,
generated with the same algorithm, have completely different distributions.
As there is heterogeneity in the distribution of links, a good strategy to find
efficient equilibria could be that of targeting as contributors those nodes with
10It is well known that random regular and scale–free networks do not have some of
the properties, as clustering or assortativity, that real world networks have (see Newman
(2003) and Jackson and Rogers (2007) for more discussion), and that other models would
be more realistic in generating large random networks. However, as we are working with
small networks of 20 nodes, the two models that we are using provide the necessary distinc-
tion between a homogeneous and a heterogeneous distribution of links, and differentiations
on other dimensions are irrelevant.
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many links. However, in this way we may not find the good equilibrium with
only 4 contributors, where a node with 10 links is not contributing, while
two of the four contributors have only 3 links. Also in this class of random
networks we are able to find and compare all the equilibria only by controlling
all the 220 ≃ 106 possible pure strategy profiles. 
Pajek Pajek
Figure 4: Two NE for the same scale–free network of 20 nodes and av-
erage degree 4. Picture is obtained by means of the software Pajek
(http://pajek.imfm.si/).
In the simulations we do the following. First we generate a random net-
work with one of the two models; then we count all the NΩ equilibria of that
network out of all the pure strategy profiles, and from this information we
can easily obtain also ∆ ≡ U∗ − U∗, for that particular network. Then we
compute the Markov matrix induced, on the set Ω of NE, by the application
of F and the iteration of B to any element of that set. From this we get the
information about which ones of the NE of that network are also local min-
ima of the Markov process, and also about which ones are local minima but
not MNE. Finally, we run simulated annealing on that matrix with different
values of ǫ > ǫ¯.
In principle, as we obtain the Markov matrix, we could apply theoretical
results (see e.g. the lectures of Catoni (1999)) to approximate the accuracy
and the speed of convergence that any ǫ would give. The problem is that any
single different network, obtained with the same model, may have a com-
pletely different number and distribution of the NE. The theoretical results
could be applied only for a particular network or for very specific and com-
pletely symmetric classes of networks, for which the problem of finding the
MNE is however a trivial one to solve.
We run the simulation described above with 50 random regular networks
of 20 nodes and degree 4, and with 50 scale–free networks of 20 nodes and
average degree 4. We use a log–grid of ǫ’s that are multiple of ǫ¯. The
factor of multiplicity ranges from 10 to 1000. For any run of the simulated
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annealing we report the time needed to find a NE.11 We report also a measure
of accuracy of the resulting NE. This measure is normalized to be 0 if the
number of nodes contributing is U∗, and is 1 if the contributors are U
∗: more
precisely if the number of contributors is n the accuracy is n−U∗
U∗−U∗
. Note that
we know the value of U∗ and U
∗ for each of the networks that we analyze only
because we are in a completely controlled environment. Finally, we report
how all the NE are distributed in the 50 networks, by number of contributors,
and how many of them are local minima of the Markov process but not MNE.
Results are shown in Figures 5 and 6. The number of time–steps needed
for convergence on a single realization of simulated annealing on each of the
50 different networks are shown as box–plots in the left panels: the thick
lines represent the log–median of the realizations, the edges of the rectangles
are first and third log–quartiles, whiskers cover all those observation that
would be in the 99% confidence interval (above or below) if the data were
log–normal, crosses are outliers outside this range. The distribution of times
is almost the same in the two classes of networks.
Figure 5: Results of the simulated annealing on 50 random regular networks
of 20 nodes and degree 4, for ǫ ranging from 101 to 103. In the left panel
we have the box–plot of the time needed for convergence; in the center we
have the box–plot of the accuracy of the the algorithm (normalized to be
optimal at 0); in the right panel we have the distribution of NE (black) in
the 50 networks and those NE (in grey) which are local minima of the Markov
process, but not MNE.
The accuracy of simulated annealing is reported in the center panels.
The scale and the box–plot on the y–axis is now linear. Simulated annealing
performs better on random regular networks, where, even if ǫ = 1000 · ǫ¯,
at least half of the realizations converge to the MNE. This is clearly not the
11We assume that the simulated annealing algorithm that we run converges when it
does not change for 104 steps, and a threshold is set at 107 steps.
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Figure 6: Results of the simulated annealing on 50 random scale free networks
of 20 nodes and average degree 4, for ǫ ranging from 101 to 103. The three
plots have the same legend as in Figure 5.
case for the scale–free networks. The reason for this is not that the scale–free
networks have more local minima. The right panels report the frequency of
all the NE, and that of non–MNE local minima (in grey), as a function of the
number of contributors. For the 50 random regular networks the variance of
contributors between NE is much smaller (the network in Example 3 is an
exception), and even if almost 28% of the NE are non–MNE local minima,
the density of contributors they have is very close to the minimal one. For
the 50 scale–free networks, NE are much more heterogeneous in the number
of contributors, and even if only 6% of them are non–MNE local minima,
they can have many more contributors than the MNE have.
The main insight from the simulations is that, for some networks, the
simulated annealing approach, that we implement in our mechanism, works
well and fast even for ǫ ≫ ǫ¯, while this is not the case for others. And
this distinction is not trivial. In regular random networks it is actually very
difficult to argue ex–ante who are the contributors in the MNE, because of the
full homogeneity between them. However, a fast version of the mechanism
is reasonably accurate in such networks because the Markov process induced
by the mechanism itself does not get trapped in the local minima far from
the MNE. On the other hand, in scale–free networks one could approach a
NE with a low number of contributors by targeting the hubs, i.e. those nodes
with many links. This strategy will probably find only a local minimum, and
this problem arises even when we run our mechanism. A fast version of the
mechanism is not accurate in such networks because such local minima may
have many more contributors than the MNE of the network.
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4 Short considerations
The problem of finding a MNE among all the NE is in general not a trivial
one, and the difference between the aggregate number of nodes playing 1
in NE could vary significantly even in homogeneous networks, as shown in
Example 3. The star structure (Example 2) is a trivial but dramatic example:
there are two NE, one in which the center alone plays 1, and another in which
all the spokes do so and the center free rides.
The main practical problem in the implementation of the mechanism we
propose is clearly the necessity of infinite time. This paper is only theoreti-
cal. However, simulated annealing is used in practice in many optimization
problems.12 For any ǫ > 0 the system will reach a local minimum, which can
be easily identified even in finite time (the higher the ǫ the faster the conver-
gence). Noting that the values ǫ < ǫ¯ are typically irrealistically low, and that
the algorithm therefor converges very slowly, the choice of a proper heuristic
ǫ > ǫ¯ could be appropriate. This choice would depend on a profit/costs com-
parison but also, in the case of finite time, on the structure of the network
(e.g. the star needs a single flip to move from the bad NE to the MNE).
As shown in Section 3, a particular care should be applied because for some
networks there is a concrete risk of finding a local minimum that is very
inefficient
Finally, even if the planner does initially not know the real structure of
the network, she could infer it link by link as the steps of the mechanism
are played. In this way she could mix the mechanism with a theoretical
investigation, and could target nodes non–randomly in order to maximize the
likelihood of finding the desired MNE. The analysis of such a sophisticated
approach would be much more complicated. What we give here is an upper
bound that, we prove, holds exactly (even if in the limit of infinite time).
Any improvement on this na¨ıve mechanism will work as well, faster, but not
in finite short time for any possible network, because the original problem is
NP–hard.
Appendices
A Theorem B in Geman and Geman (1984)
Geman and Geman (1984) is a pioneering theoretical paper on computer
graphics, studying the best achievable quality of images. Sections X to XII
12Crama and Schyns (2003) is a good example related to finance.
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are devoted to the general case of optimization among a finite number of
states. We find there a general theorem (Theorem B at page 731) proving
a conjecture on the Simulated Annealing heuristic algorithm proposed by
Kirkpatrick, Gelatt and Vecchi (1983). The arising popularity of Simulated
Annealing has attested the success of Geman and Geman (1984), which is
now cited (according to scholar.google.com in January 2010) by almost 10000
papers from all disciplines.
In this appendix we summarize what is necessary for us from this result,
with some of the original notation but avoiding most of the thermodynamics
jargon. Suppose that there is a finite set Ω of states, and a function U :
Ω → R+, so that, for any ω ∈ Ω, U(ω) is a positive number. Call U
∗ ≡
maxω∈Ω U(ω) the maximal value of U , U∗ ≡ minω∈Ω U(ω) its minimal value,
and Ω0 ≡ argminω∈Ω U(ω) those states whose value is U∗. Suppose moreover
that we have a fixed transition matrix X between all the elements of Ω and
that this stochastic matrix X is ergodic, i.e. there is a positive probability of
reaching any state ω′ ∈ Ω from any other state ω′′ ∈ Ω. Given any ω ∈ Ω, call
X(ω) all those states that can be reached from ω with positive probability,
through X , with a single step.
Consider now a discrete time flow with t = 1, 2, . . . and the following new
stochastic process. ω1 is any member of Ω. Imagine that, at time t, the
process is in the state ωt, then apply X from ωt, obtaining a state that we
call ωnewt . We now define ωt+1 as
ωt+1 ≡


ωnewt with probability
{
1 if U(ωnewt ) < U(ωt) ,
t−ǫ(U(ω
new
t
)−U(ωt)) otherwise;
ωt otherwise.
(3)
The probability t−ǫ(U(ω
new
t
)−U(ωt)) in (3) identifies the level of acceptance of
non–improving changes, which is declining in time at a rate that depends on
the constant ǫ > 0. Any such stochastic process will be identified by ω0 and
ǫ: call it Pω0,ǫ.
It is easy to prove that at the limit t → ∞ any realization of Pω0,ǫ will
end up in a set of local minima Ωǫ ⊆ Ω. Ωǫ is such that, for any ω
′, ω′′ ∈ Ωǫ
and ωX ∈ X(ω
′), U(ω′) = U(ω′′) and U(ω′) ≤ U(ωX).
The theorem imposes a single condition on ǫ so that the local minima
obtained through Pω0,ǫ are also global minima.
Theorem B: call NΩ the cardinality of Ω and ∆ ≡ U
∗−U∗. If ǫ < ǫ¯ ≡
1
NΩ∆
,
then Ωǫ ⊆ Ω0 for any realization of Pω0,ǫ, independently of ω0.
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The proof is by no means trivial, it takes various pages and it is heavily
based on the ergodicity of the system. In Geman and Geman’s notation, what
they call temperature is 1
ǫ log t
. They prove, moreover, that, in the presence
of more global minima, the probabilities of ending in any one of them are
uniform.
B Proof of Lemmas
Consider a finite network and call xi ∈ {0, 1} the action of node i, so that ~x
is the vector of the actions of all the nodes. Call N1i the set of nodes which
are first neighbors of node i, and N2i those which are second neighbors of
node i.
We also need the following definitions. A set of nodes in a network is
an independent set if, for every link of the network, not both its nodes are
in the set. A set C of nodes in a network is a covering if, for every node
i, C ∩ ({i} ∪N1i ) 6= ∅ (i.e. if for any node i we consider the set made of i
itself and its first neighbors, then at least one of them is also a member of
C). A set of nodes in a network is a maximal independent set if it is both an
independent set and a covering. In our notation a maximal independent set
is characterized by those nodes playing 1 in a NE ~x.
Finally, remember that we have defined the basic transition step B of best
response as a Markov process across all states ~x, where an unsatisfied node
(if existing) is picked with uniform probabilities, and her action is flipped. If
there are no unsatisfied nodes ~x is a NE and an absorbing state for B.
Proof of Lemmas 1 and 2: suppose that xi = 1 and we flip her action
so that xnewi = 0. Consider now any node j in N
1
i , it is clear that xj = 0
since xi = 1. All and only new unsatisfied nodes will be all those j ∈ N
1
i
such that xk = 0 for any k ∈ N
1
j \{i}.
13 If we apply the transition step B to
one of them, call her j, she will be satisfied again and all her neighbors will
be, because if j is such that xj = 0 and x
new
j = 1, it is surely the case that
any k ∈ N1j \{i} was playing xk = 0 and remains at x
new
k = 0.
It could be the case that two such j’s that are both neighbors of i and
together, are unsatisfied after i’s shift. The fact that one of the two may be
chosen instead of the other in an iteration of B is the only random part in
the best response rule.
As the neighbors of i are finite B needs to be iterated at most |N1i | times
and the propagation of best response is limited to N1i .
13If this set is empty, then the only unsatisfied node is i, but as we will prove below it
cannot be the case if we start by applying F to a node who was originally playing 0.
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Note: a best response from 0 to 1 applies only to nodes that are playing
0, are linked to a node which is shifting from 1 to 0, and that node is the only
neighbor they have who is originally playing 1.
Suppose now that xi = 0 is chosen by the stochastic transition F , and
we flip her action so that xnewi = 1. The nodes j in N
1
i who were playing
xj = 0 will continue to do so, as they will remain satisfied and B will not
apply to them. Any node j in N1i (at least one) who was playing xj = 1
may be selected by B and will then move to xnewj = 0. Note that there is no
indeterminacy in how they will be selected by B, as they cannot be neighbors
together, as they were all playing 1 in a NE.
By the previous point this will create a propagation, through B to some
k ∈ N1j , but not i, who is now satisfied, and not even to any other k ∈
N1j ∩N
1
i , for the same reason. This proves that the propagation of the best
response B is limited to N2i , and that it ends in a new NE in a number of
steps that is at most |N1i ∪N
2
i |. 
Proof of Lemma 3: we proceed by defining intermediate NE ~x1, ~x2. . .
between any two NE ~x and ~x′. ~xn+1 will be obtained from ~xn by flipping one
node from 0 to 1 (through F ) and waiting for the best response (the iteration
of B, which has been proved above to be finite).
If two NE ~x and ~x′ are different, it must be that there is at least one i1
such that xi1 = 0 and x
′
i1
= 1 (it is easy to check that any strict subset of
a maximal independent set is not a covering any more). Change the action
of that node so that x1i1 = x
′
i1
= 1. By previous proof this will propagate
deterministically to N1i1 and, for all j ∈ N
1
i1
, we will have x1j = x
′
j = 0.
Propagation may also affect N2i1 but this is of no importance for our purposes.
If still ~x1 6= ~x′, then take another node i2 such that x
1
i2
= 0 and x′i2 = 1
(i2 is clearly not a member of N
1
i1
∪ {i1}). Pose x
2
i2
= x′i2 = 1, this will
change some other nodes by best response, but not j ∈ N1i1 ∪ {i1}, because
any j ∈ N1i1 can rely on x
1
i1
= 1, and then also x2i1 = x
1
i1
= 1 is fixed.
We can go on as long as ~xn 6= ~x′, taking any node in+1 for which x
n
in+1
= 0
and x′in+1 = 1. This process will converge to ~x
n → ~x′ in a finite number of
steps because:
• when in+1 shifts from 0 to 1, the nodes j ∈
⋃n
h=1
(
N1ih ∪ {ih}
)
will not
change, since they are either 0–players with a 1–player beside already
(the 1–player is some ih, with h ≤ n), or a 1 (some ih) surrounded by
frozen 0’s;
• by construction it is never the case that in+1 ∈
⋃n
h=1
(
N1ih ∪ {ih}
)
,
because for all j ∈
⋃n
h=1
(
N1ih ∪ {ih}
)
we have that xnj = x
′
j ;
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• the network is finite. 
In the above proof, the shift from ~x to ~x′ is done by construction re–
defining the covering of any ~xn from the covering of ~x′. It is always certain
that, by best response, any ~xn is also an independent set.
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